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ABSTRACT
A majority of Justices on the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court have increasingly
adopted a largely libertarian view of the constitutional right to the freedom of
expression. Indeed, on issues ranging from campaign finance to offensive speech to
symbolic speech to commercial speech to online expression, the Court has struck
down many laws on free speech grounds. Much of the reasoning in these cases
mirrors John Stuart Mill’s arguments in On Liberty. This is not new, as Mill’s
position on free speech has been advocated by some members of the Court for a
century. However, the advocacy of Mill’s position has grown over time, to the point
now where it is the dominant view expressed by the Justices in free speech cases.
Even where the majority has in recent years found limits to free speech rights
(including in cases involving student speech, public employee speech, and speech
related to foreign terrorist organizations), several Justices have advocated a Millian
framework and arguably followed the exceptions that Mill outlined when advocating
the Harm Principle for free speech. Through textual analysis of illustrative cases we
demonstrate the growth of Mill’s influence on the Supreme Court and where the
Justices have deviated from what Mill advocated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has been
adopting a broader vision of the freedom of expression that is
protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Although
these decisions are not always unanimous, the Supreme Court’s
growing free speech libertarianism can be seen in its striking down of
laws and practices that have prohibited the following: burning the
American flag,1 burning a cross,2 advertising alcohol,3 making
indecent online communications to minors,4 advertising casino
gaming,5 posting virtual child pornography online,6 making corporate
independent expenditures in campaigns for public office,7 making
contributions to candidates for public office in excess of aggregate
statutory limits,8 depicting animal torture,9 selling violent video games
to children,10 engaging in hate speech,11 lying about having won
military medals,12 protesting outside of abortion clinics,13 accessing
the Internet as a registered sex offender,14 adopting a racially
disparaging trademark,15 and adopting a trademark that is regarded as
immoral or scandalous.16 Considering this plethora of rulings, the
modern Court is a case study in promoting a libertarian view of the
freedom of expression.
The Court’s decisions were not always so protective of the
freedom of expression. Prior to World War I, the Court held a rather
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014).
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
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crabbed view of the Free Speech Clause. Over the century since World
War I, the Court has often struggled over how to balance what is
protected by the First Amendment. With the notable exceptions of
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis Brandeis, followed later
by Justices like Hugo Black and William Douglas, most Court
members from 1919 until the 1960s adopted a much more restrictive
interpretation of the freedom of expression. The majority of Justices
instead used the Bad Tendency Test or a narrow understanding of the
Clear and Present Danger Test to judge the constitutionality of limits
on expression, or the Court deemed major categories of expression to
have little to no First Amendment protection. Over time, however, a
majority on the Court has adopted reasoning on the freedom of
expression that mirrors much of what British political philosopher
John Stuart Mill argued in his famous book On Liberty, where he
advocated for the protection of “absolute freedom of opinion and
sentiment on all subjects.”17 Indeed, support for this position has been
growing on the Court and becoming more popular among its members
for a century, coming to fruition in the last few decades and becoming
the dominant view of the freedom of expression. Furthermore, even in
recent cases where the majority has curtailed free speech rights
(including cases involving public employee speech,18 student speech,19
speech related to foreign terrorist organizations,20 and speech by
judicial candidates21), the Court has been reasoning within a Millian
framework and arguably adhering to notable exceptions to free speech
rights that Mill described when advocating the Harm Principle.
Our article will proceed as follows. Part II reviews Mill’s theory on
the freedom of expression and its basis in the Harm Principle as
explained in On Liberty. Part III describes how Justice Holmes, along
with Justice Brandeis, began advocating for a position on free speech
similar to Mill’s in the early twentieth century. Part IV explains how
the other members of the Court struggled over the ensuing decades on
whether to adopt a similar position as Mill and Holmes/Brandeis, with
Justices Black and Douglas later carrying the mantle for this approach.
17

18
19
20
21

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co. 1978) (1859) [hereinafter MILL].
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
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Part V subsequently expounds on how the Court majority began to be
swayed by this more libertarian view, with the current Court largely
adopting it and repeatedly striking down legislation in violation of the
Harm Principle. Part VI will emphasize how, even as the Court has
become more enamored with the freedom of speech than at any other
time in its history, there remain cases where the Court upholds
significant restrictions on the freedom of expression; these cases can
be seen as matching the exceptions Mill had to his general rule on
when speech should be protected. Overall, through textual analysis of
illustrative examples, we will demonstrate the growth of Mill’s
influence on the Supreme Court and where the Justices have deviated
from what Mill advocated.
II. JOHN STUART MILL’S FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE HARM
PRINCIPLE IN ON LIBERTY
John Stuart Mill published On Liberty in 1859 to explain his
utilitarian position on how to resolve the conflict between majority
rule and minority rights.22 With the acceptance of democratic
governance, majoritarian rule came to be seen as the legitimate
expression of “the people.” Mill worried, however, that “[t]he ‘people’
who exercise the power are not always the same people with those
over whom it is exercised; and the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not
the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest.”23 Mill
knew that he was not alone in decrying the “tyranny of the majority,”24
understanding that too often, society is over-willing to restrict
individual freedom on the grounds of preserving public order or to
protect society from immorality. Mill did not dispute that there must
be limits to individual freedom, but he worried that the limits which
society draws are often arbitrary and reflect the particular “prejudices
or superstitions” of the dominant group.25
According to Mill, the Harm Principle is the appropriate way to
resolve this conflict. He described the Harm Principle as follows in On
Liberty: “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
22
23
24

25

Elizabeth Rapaport, Editor’s Introduction to MILL, supra note 17, at vii–viii.
MILL, supra note 17, at 4.
Terence H. Qualter, John Stuart Mill, Disciple of de Tocqueville, 13 W. POL. Q.
880, 883–84 (1960).
MILL, supra note 17, at 6.

2020

Absolute Freedom of Opinion

7

prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not
a sufficient warrant.”26 In other words, government should generally
protect individual liberties, even if exercising them may cause harm to
the person exercising those liberties or will be immoral in some way. It
is only the causing of physical harm or property harm to others that
Mill finds to be a sufficient justification for restraining human
freedoms.27 Mill continued to say that one “cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to
do so would be wise or even right.”28 Put another, more succinct, way,
“[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.”29 Mill’s position on freedom was part of his greater
philosophy of utilitarianism, whereby he modified Jeremy Bentham’s
notion of the Greatest Happiness Principle.30 Mill regarded utility to
mean that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness” and “wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness,” with special emphasis placed on the “higher pleasures”
that include intellectual pursuits.31 This distinction by Mill explains
why the focus of On Liberty is connecting individual liberty with wellbeing and, indeed, to the capacity to flourish as a human being. A
person who does not evaluate his or her life critically (through neglect
or because of a lack of freedom), “does not educate or develop in him
any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human
being. The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference are exercised only
in making a choice.”32 As we will explore below, this explains why the
freedom of expression in particular was an important right to be
protected in Mill’s scheme.
There are limits to Mill’s Harm Principle, however. Mill did not
advocate that this level of freedom should pertain to all persons. First,
26
27

28
29
30

31
32

Id. at 9.
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 120–21 (1999).
MILL, supra note 17, at 9.
Id.
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 3–4 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.
1979) (1861).
Id. at 7, 10.
MILL, supra note 17, at 56.
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Mill proclaimed that “[i]t is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this
doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of
their faculties. We are not speaking of children or of young persons
below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or
womanhood.”33 Therefore, one needs to reach a certain age and stage
of mental development before the Harm Principle applies, and before
such an age, society may put more limits on one’s freedom, according
to Mill.34 His text, referring to the “maturity of their faculties,” also
suggests that adults who are mentally ill or are below a certain level of
intelligence would not be fully protected by the Harm Principle. One
can derive this from later statements Mill makes where he claims
limiting freedom is acceptable in the young because they still require
“being taken care of by others,”35 an argument that could also apply to
certain narrow classes of adults.
Second, Mill did not believe that the Harm Principle was the
appropriate way to judge freedom for “backward states of society.”36
Instead, Mill averred that “[d]espotism is a legitimate mode of
government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their
improvement and the means justified by actually effecting that end.”37
Mill also warned his readers against the “East” where “the despotism
of custom” has made “a people all alike, all governing their thoughts
and conduct by the same maxims and rules.”38 From a writer whose
views, at the time, were so progressive on women’s rights,39 this
racism and ethnocentrism may come as surprising; even more so when
one considers that Mill emphasized our tendency to place an
“unbounded reliance” on our own cultural, political, and social
norms.40 Indeed, according to Mill in On Liberty, the following was
true of many persons:

33
34

35
36
37
38
39

40

Id. at 9.
Rudi Verburg, John Stuart Mill’s Political Economy: Educational Means to
Moral Progress, 64 REV. SOC. ECON. 225, 234–35 (2006).
MILL, supra note 17, at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 67–69.
Wendy Donner, John Stuart Mill’s Liberal Feminism, 69 PHIL. STUD. 155, 155
(1993).
MILL, supra note 17, at 17.
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He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of
being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other
people; and it never troubles him that mere accident
has decided which of these numerous worlds is the
object of his reliance, and that the same causes which
make him a churchman in London would have made
him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking.41
Nevertheless, Mill’s language made it clear that he believed even these
societies he called “backward” or filled with “barbarians” have the
capacity to progress and that once they do, they too must be given the
freedom that his home country rightly enjoyed:
[A]s soon as mankind have attained the capacity of
being guided to their own improvement by conviction or
persuasion . . . compulsion, either in the direct form or
in that of pains and penalties for noncompliance, is no
longer admissible as a means to their own good, and
justifiable only for the security of others.42
Thus, according to Mill and in somewhat of a puzzle, “backwards”
states may first need to be under illiberal rule, where basic freedoms
are denied to them before liberal freedoms (like the freedom of
speech) can be protected in the full sense that Mill envisioned.43
Third, Mill asserted that “[t]here are also many positive acts for the
benefit of others which [one] may rightfully be compelled to perform,”
including “certain acts of individual beneficence.”44 For Mill, this
categorical exception included things such as being required to give
evidence in a court of law, to be drafted into the military, or to act as a
Good Samaritan.45 This third exception includes situations where one
has chosen to take on familial or public responsibilities—in those
cases one can be compelled to act.46 For instance, Mill described in
detail the “duties of the parents” to make certain provisions to their

41
42
43

44
45
46

Id.
Id. at 10.
William Voegeli, Liberalism and Tolerance, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 319, 322
(2017).
MILL, supra note 17, at 10.
Id. at 10–11.
Y.N. Chopra, Mill’s Principle of Liberty, 69 PHIL. 417, 436–37 (1994).
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children, including education and nourishment.47 Similarly, Mill told
his readers that if one holds a job where one has responsibilities to the
public, then one’s liberties may be curtailed more than would be the
case for the general populace. Mill described this as follows: “when a
person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the
performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he
is guilty of a social offense.”48 Mill went on to colorfully state the
following:
No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk;
but a soldier or policeman should be punished for being
drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite
damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an
individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the
province of liberty and placed in that of morality or
law.49
These are all examples of duties one has agreed to complete.
Therefore, the Harm Principle does not absolve a person of fulfilling
“other-regarding” activities that one previously volunteered to
undertake.50
Upon explaining the contours of his Harm Principle, Mill turned to
the specifics of the freedom of expression. He described what are First
Amendment freedoms in the United States as the primary examples of
the liberty that should be protected:
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It
comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness,
demanding liberty of conscience in the most
comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling,
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all
subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or
theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing
opinions may seem to fall under a different principle,
since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an
individual which concerns other people, but, being
47
48
49
50

MILL, supra note 17, at 104.
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 80.
Anthony D’Amato, Natural Law – A Libertarian View, 3 FIU L. REV. 97, 100–
101 (2007).
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almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought
itself and resting in great part on the same reasons, is
practically inseparable from it.51
The freedoms of religion, speech, and press were all tied together in
Mill’s mind because they all stem from the liberty of thought.52 Mill
referenced these three rights similarly to show how these rights were
tied together in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”53 Mill advocated protection of a broad
notion of the freedom of expression, encompassing modes of
communication that are not just oral, but also written and in other
forms. Furthermore, Mill announced that when it comes to the freedom
of expression, “[i]f all mankind minus one were of one opinion,
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than
he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.”54
This is one of the strongest assertions of what should be protected by
the freedom of expression.
Mill next explained why the freedom of expression is a key liberty
that needs to be protected in all cases, whether the expression is true or
not. First, Mill declared that, for obvious reasons, the freedom of
expression should be protected where “the opinion which it is
attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true.”55 Mill told
the reader that humans are fallible, and silencing a speaker who states
the truth is “robbing the human race” because “they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth.”56 Put another way, Mill
stated that “every age [has] held many opinions which subsequent ages
have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many
opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages.”57 Thus, for
Mill, we may believe someone to be speaking something offensive or
false, but we may be wrong, so silencing such a speaker is bad for the
51
52

53
54
55
56
57

MILL, supra note 17, at 11–12.
Karen Zivi, Cultivating Character: John Stuart Mill and the Subject of Rights,
50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 49, 56–58 (2006).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
MILL, supra note 17, at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
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human race in the long run.58 Said differently, according to Mill there
is no conceivable reason to silence the truth or what may be true.
Second, Mill proclaimed that the freedom of expression should be
protected when the speech contains both some truth and some falsity:
[T]hough the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and
very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and
since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject
is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the
collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the
truth has any chance of being supplied.59
Even if a statement contains just a kernel of truth, the speaker is
partially speaking the truth. In silencing that view, the government
would, therefore, be suppressing some truth.60 Mill admitted that much
speech is like this, containing some truth but also some falsity.61 When
describing our observations, we may try to make ourselves (and our
arguments) look better, or we may have simply misperceived an event
or what we have read or heard. Thus, what we often say may contain
some truth and some falsity. Mill saw no reason to ban such speech
even if it has only a kernel of truth because of the great value he
placed on hearing the truth.
But what about the situation where everything that a speaker states
is false? And what if we actually knew what they were saying is false?
Would we be justified in silencing such a speaker? For Mill, the
answer remained no because of the benefit to humanity of hearing
contrasting views. Mill professed that:
[E]ven if the received opinion be not only true, but the
whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is,
vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of
those who receive it, be held in the manner of a
prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its
rational grounds.62
58

59
60

61
62

Nigel Rapport, The Liberal Treatment of Difference: An Untimely Meditation on
Culture and Civilization, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 687, 691 (2011).
MILL, supra note 17, at 50.
Mark Strasser, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis, and a True Threat to Brandenburg, 26
BYU J. PUB. L. 37, 56 (2011).
MILL, supra note 17, at 50–51.
Id.
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Mill explained that there is value in us constantly reevaluating our
beliefs and being able to defend them, or else we will start merely
believing simple dogma. As he colorfully stated at one point in On
Liberty, “[b]oth teachers and learners go to sleep at their posts as soon
as there is no enemy in the field.”63 In other words, Mill believed that
government should not silence these types of speakers, even when
what they spout is something the overwhelming majority of society
has concluded is an absolutely false statement. This perceived false
view helps those who think they are right be able to defend what they
believe to be true.64
Mill’s strong defense of the freedom of expression, or what he
called “absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects,”65
against government interference applies to many situations. Take, for
example, where Mill described that if one will “misstate the elements
of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion.”66 He went on to
write that “still less could law presume to interfere with this kind of
controversial misconduct.”67 Mill also appeared to support protecting
the freedom of speech against government interference when the
speech is something we believe to be not only false, but also offensive
and hateful.68
Significantly, Mill argued that all types of speech ought to be
protected, even cases where speakers engage in “intemperate
discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like.”69
The context in which this arises is noteworthy because Mill contended
that demands for a “studied moderation of language” are a way in
which the dominant group disenfranchises the voices of the
powerless.70 For Mill, the language of protest, of satire, and of ridicule
are, at times, the only weapons the weak have to make their case
heard. Enforcement of rules of decorum in debate will often be
63
64

65
66
67
68

69
70

Id. at 41.
Jeremy J. Ofseyer, Taking Liberties with John Stuart Mill, 1999 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 395, 425 (1999); see also Rapport, supra note 58, at 691.
MILL, supra note 17, at 11.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1596, 1649 (2010).
MILL, supra note 17, at 51.
Id.
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selective, resulting in the government ultimately helping one side and
hurting another.71 Mill warned that calls for civil discourse are shot
through with hypocrisy; when satire or intemperate language is
employed by those who favor received opinion, “they may not only be
used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him
who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation.”72
With such a mixture of ideas—the true, the false, the confused, and
the intemperate—how can one come to the truth? Mill’s answer was
the marketplace of ideas. We have already seen how Mill advocated
that prevailing opinions are best fortified by hearing from the
opposition.73 Later in On Liberty, Mill declared that people must “be
free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to
exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions.”74 However,
Mill did not mean to make the reader believe that all opinions are of
equal quality. Rather, Mill thought that the proper remedy to illinformed speech is to respond with well-informed speech.75 Mill
clarified that while it is “obvious that law and authority have no
business with restraining” speech, it is the case that “opinion ought, in
every instance, to determine its verdict by the circumstances of the
individual case.”76 Mill was not naïve and did not believe that the
truth, in and of itself, will always win out, noting “[m]en are not more
zealous for truth than they often are for error.”77 However, he did
believe that the truth will always resurface and that it will eventually
gain acceptance.78 According to Mill, the free market of ideas is what
shall determine what is right and wrong in opinion, and the
government should take no steps to limit any speakers.79

71

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand’s Seven Other Ideas About the Freedom of
Speech, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 734–35 (2018).
MILL, supra note 17, at 51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821,
829–30 (2008); see also id. at 871 (explaining how Mill’s views on free speech
formed a part of Justice Holmes’s conception of a “market-place of ideas”).
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Beyond his limits on freedom generally noted above, the only
additional limit on the freedom of expression which Mill allowed was
when one’s speech might serve as an immediate incitement to harm
others.80 As explained below, the modern U.S. Supreme Court has
employed similar reasoning for permitting restrictions on speech.
Thus, it is important that Mill’s “indispensable” proviso in this regard
be fully recounted:
No one pretends that actions should be as free as
opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their
immunity when the circumstances in which they are
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a
positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion
that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or that
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested
when simply circulated through the press, but may
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an
excited mob . . . . Acts, of whatever kind, which without
justifiable cause do harm to others may be, and in the
more important cases absolutely require to be,
controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when
needful, by the active interference of mankind.81
Mill advocated for a narrow government power to restrict expression if
there was a tangible and immediate threat of harm, such as provoking
an angry crowd. The reason why Mill found this example to be a
situation when the expression cannot be protected is because there is
no time for the listeners to reflect upon the logic of such a speech
when they are in a mob that is whipped up into a frenzy.82 As explored
in more detail in the parts that follow, Mill supported restricting
speech when that speech could lead to something similar to imminent
lawless action,83 a standard comparable to what was advocated by
Justice Holmes and eventually adopted by the Court in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.84 This is also consistent with Mill’s advocacy of the more
general Harm Principle to protect human freedom.
80
81
82
83
84

MILL, supra note 17, at 53.
Id.
Strasser, supra note 60, at 42.
Ofseyer, supra note 64, at 412–13.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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III. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. BEGINS ADVOCATING MILL’S
FREE SPEECH POSITION
For the first 129 years of its history, the U.S. Supreme Court had
relatively little to say about the meaning of the freedom of expression
that is protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, the right to the
freedom of speech was not incorporated to apply to states until Gitlow
v. New York,85 meaning there were few germane cases for the Court to
review state action that touched upon this right. Furthermore, until the
early twentieth century, a lack of relevant federal statutory regulation
and congressional limits on the Court’s procedural and substantive
jurisdiction left the Justices little opportunity to interpret the textual
commands of the First Amendment as they applied to the federal
government.86 Nevertheless, toward the end of the nineteenth century,
the Court began issuing some significant decisions on the freedom of
speech. The reasoning in these rulings, however, was a far cry from
the philosophy of John Stuart Mill.
For instance, in Davis v. Massachusetts the Court upheld the
conviction of a reverend who preached on government property in
violation of a Boston ordinance that prohibited making an address on
public grounds without a permit from the mayor.87 In affirming
Davis’s conviction for a unanimous Court, Justice Edward White
viewed the ordinance as a question of government having the power to
control its property, ignoring the implications for the freedom of
speech (or the freedom of religion):
The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution of
the United States does not destroy the power of the
[S]tates to enact police regulations as to the subjects
within their control, and does not have the effect of
creating a particular and personal right in the citizen to
use public property in defiance of the constitution and
laws of the state.88
The freedom of speech fared no better in United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, where the Court upheld the exclusion of an alien
85
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who was believed to have advocated the political philosophy of
anarchism.89 Chief Justice Melville Fuller wrote for another
unanimous Court that held that the law which permitted the
government to exclude or expel illegal aliens could not violate the
First Amendment because, on its face, the law “has no reference
to . . . nor [does it] abridge the freedom of speech.”90 According to
Chief Justice Fuller, any constitutional protections for the freedom of
speech applied to citizens only; even if Turner was “cut off
from . . . speaking or publishing . . . in the country,” it was “merely
because of his exclusion therefrom. He does not become one of the
people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by an
attempt to enter, forbidden by law.”91 Fuller went on to reason that
“[e]ven if Turner . . . only regarded the absence of government as a
political ideal . . . when he sought to attain it by advocating
[anarchy] . . . we cannot say that the inference was unjustifiable either
that he contemplated the ultimate realization of his ideal by the use of
force, or that his speeches were incitements to that end.”92 Thus,
simply advocating anarchism was enough justification for the
government to exclude Turner, something Mill clearly would not have
supported. It is noteworthy that Justice Holmes participated in this
case and sided with Fuller and the majority.
Holmes penned the opinion of the Court in Patterson v. Colorado,
a case where a 7-2 majority upheld a contempt conviction against
newspaper publisher Thomas Patterson for printing articles and a
cartoon critical of the state’s supreme court.93 Finding no violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Holmes wrote that it could not be shown
that the contempt conviction was arbitrary, and as such, the decision
was “a matter of local law.”94 After deferring to the state on the
contempt matter, Holmes, in addressing the freedom of expression
issue, declined to definitively state if the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the freedom of expression.95 Holmes opined that even if
the freedom of expression is protected against state infringement, the
89
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freedom of speech under the First Amendment merely prohibits prior
restraints.96 Accordingly, Holmes declared that the Constitution does
“not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed
contrary to the public welfare.”97 Holmes then made what was
quintessentially an anti-Millian statement: “[t]he preliminary freedom
extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment
may extend as well to the true as to the false.”98 In other words, even if
the prohibition on prior restraint protects false speech, the government
may, in pursuance of a vague notion of “public welfare,” subsequently
punish both false and true speech.
It was not long before the Justices upheld a blanket prior restraint.
Eight years after upholding Patterson’s seditious libel conviction, the
Court, in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,
subsequently found no violation in a state-created review board that
had the power to screen all movies before they could be publicly
shown.99 Justice Joseph McKenna wrote, for a unanimous Court, that
although films may have many praiseworthy qualities, “they may be
used for evil” as well, especially if they are shown to children or if “a
prurient interest may be excited and appealed to” in a film.100 Even
though the power of this Ohio review board was challenged because it
was a type of prior restraint, McKenna rejected this by simply finding
that motion pictures were not subject to a constitutional protection of
the freedom of speech: “the exhibition of moving pictures is a
business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like
other spectacles, not to be regarded . . . we think, as part of the press of
the country, or as organs of public opinion.”101 Like in Turner and
Patterson, Justice Holmes sided with the majority in taking this rather
crabbed, non-Millian view of the freedom of speech.
Holmes’s approach to these issues began to change at the close of
World War I in Schenck v. United States, a case where Holmes again
96
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wrote for the Court. Charles Schenck was prosecuted for violating the
Espionage Act after producing thousands of leaflets urging draft
resistance and mailing them to draft-eligible persons.102 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Holmes upheld Schenck’s conviction, stating
that, regarding the freedom of speech, “[t]he question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”103
Since Congress has the authority to regulate the military, and since the
distribution of the leaflets in question could obstruct draft recruitment,
Holmes sustained Schenck’s conviction.104 Holmes’s reasoning in the
case was quite Millian, in that he found speech to be protected unless it
is used to create a secondary danger where there is no time for
reasoned, dispassionate discussion of the issue.105 However, Holmes
applied this Millian standard improperly, as it is quite difficult to argue
that Schenck’s leaflets were, in the immediate moment, about to
substantively harm the U.S. war effort; indeed, there were only
15,000–16,000 of these documents printed in Philadelphia for
distribution,106 with no evidence provided that any draftee declined to
report due to reading them. The suppression was grounded in language
of the prevention of a “clear and present” harm, but the application of
the test was done in a way that was very deferential to the
government’s power to censor ideas it found disagreeable.107
Nevertheless, Holmes’s opinion for the Court in Schenck
represents a different approach to the freedom of expression than what
Holmes had previously reasoned in Patterson. What affected his shift
in reasoning on this issue? Holmes frequently met and corresponded
with Harvard lecturer Harold Laski, and in a noteworthy letter dated
February 28, 1919, Holmes alluded to the fact that he had recently
“reread Mill on [sic] Liberty” and referred to Mill positively as a “fine
old sportsman.”108 This letter, written one week before Schenck was
102
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released,109 demonstrates that Mill’s On Liberty was on Holmes’s
mind while he was penning the Court’s opinion. In fact, Laski—a
strong free speech advocate who studied Mill—recommended that
Holmes take another look at On Liberty.110
However, Holmes received significant criticism in legal circles
after authoring the Court’s opinion in Schenck, with some scholars
claiming the case did little to protect the freedom of speech.111 Most
notably, Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee criticized Holmes in
a law review article released in June of 1919.112 That same article also
referenced Mill on free speech multiple times.113 Justice Holmes
appeared to have taken note of this and other criticism, reevaluating
his application of the Clear and Present Danger Test. When the Court
was asked to review another Espionage Act conviction several months
after Schenck, in Abrams v. United States, Holmes found himself
dissenting from a decision upholding the prosecution. The majority in
Abrams took a hardline stance limiting the freedom of expression,
claiming that speech could be punished if it produced a bad tendency,
in this case the intention of promoting a general workers’ strike.114
Here the Court could not be said to be employing Mill’s indispensable
proviso, as there was no imminent threat of harm. There is no evidence
that anyone was swayed—or that many people could reasonably be
expected to be swayed—to strike due to what Holmes, in dissent,
called “a silly leaflet by an unknown man.”115 The Court majority, in
adopting this more deferential Bad Tendency Test, was making use of
an old British standard for free speech cases that dated back to Regina
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v. Hicklin.116 Holmes, however, continued to embrace a more Millian
approach to the freedom of speech in his dissent, declaring that:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises
or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and
sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by
speech seems to indicate that you think the speech
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the
circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the
result, or that you doubt either your power or your
premises. But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It
is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every
year if not every day we have to wager our salvation
upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.
While that experiment is part of our system I think that
we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country.117
There is quite a bit of Mill’s political theory contained in this dense
paragraph by Holmes. It is reminiscent of On Liberty, in that it
proclaims “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the . . . market.”118 Mill’s notion of the fallibility of
human knowledge is also quite evident in Holmes’s proclamation “that
116
117
118
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time has upset many fighting faiths.”119 And the concept of protecting
a broad range of expression, even those views “we loathe and believe
to be fraught with death,”120 continues Mill’s proclamations on
allowing speech that is both believed to be false and that is delivered
by intemperate means. Thus, Mill’s influence on Holmes’s thought is
quite evident. Holmes becomes the important bridge for the purposes
of our current discussion because he turns what is otherwise political
theory espoused by a foreign philosopher into an explanation of the
meaning of the U.S. Constitution by a sitting Supreme Court Justice.
As we shall show below, the precedential value of prior opinions
would lead future Supreme Court Justices to adopt this approach as
well.
The espousal of the Holmes/Mill approach to free speech was not
immediate, however. In Abrams, Holmes was joined solely in dissent
by Justice Louis Brandeis, who would join with Holmes several times
over the next decade in dissents (or concurrences) against majorities
that upheld speech prosecutions.121 One notable example was Gitlow v.
New York, which involved the prosecution of a communist who
printed a pamphlet (the Left Wing Manifesto) advocating for the
overthrow of capitalism in the United States.122 Justice Edward
Sanford, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the Bad Tendency Test,
declaring that “the general provisions of the statute may be
constitutionally applied to the specific utterance of the defendant if its
natural tendency and probable effect was to bring about the substantive
evil which the legislative body might prevent.”123 In dissent, Justice
Holmes again pushed his Millian version of freedom of expression:
119
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It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory,
that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It
offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on
unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of
energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only
difference between the expression of an opinion and an
incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s
enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to
reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant
discourse before us it had no chance of starting a
present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the
only meaning of free speech is that they should be given
their chance and have their way.124
Again, the influence of Mill is evident. Holmes’s dissent directly
draws from the “positive instigation” test from Mill’s proviso.125
Finding no immediate danger of lawlessness, Holmes rejected the
majority’s reasoning.126 For many people, the ideas expressed by
Gitlow in the Left Wing Manifesto were wrong, but for Holmes that
was not a sufficient reason to ban the ideas or to punish the speaker. In
fact, according to Holmes, if there is time for debate we must let these
ideas be discussed, just as advocated by Mill. Holmes did not think
these ideas would command majoritarian support, but if they did, that
is what the freedom of expression is ultimately meant to protect. Put
another way by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, “the
necessity which is essential to a valid restriction [on expression] does
not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a
clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the State
constitutionally may seek to prevent.”127
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE WITH THE
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Over the next few decades, especially after the retirement of
Holmes and Brandeis, the Court struggled to determine what was
protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. For instance,
in Thomas v. Collins the Court provided reasoning very protective of
free expression, extolling “the preferred place given in our scheme to
the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First
Amendment,”128 which mandates that “any attempt to restrict those
liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not
doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger.”129 Yet
several years later, during the Red Scare, the Court declared in Dennis
v. United States that “the societal value of speech must, on occasion,
be subordinated to other values and considerations.”130 The majority in
Dennis went on to fashion a test for the freedom of speech in which
the Court would “ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger.”131 This standard bears some similarities to
Holmes’s Clear and Present Danger Test, but the language and
application in the Dennis opinion suggest that it was more of a Clear
and Probable Danger test.132 In addition, it was during this era that the
Court formally established that certain categories of speech were
wholly outside of First Amendment protection, including “the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.”133 During the same time
period, the Court also declared that commercial speech had no First
Amendment protection by stating that although the freedom of speech
is generally protected in public forums, “the Constitution imposes no
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such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising.”134
Nevertheless, like Holmes and Brandeis before them, Justice Hugo
Black and Justice William Douglas continued to carry the torch for a
more Millian interpretation of the freedom of expression. Writing in
dissent in Dennis, Justice Black declared a form of First Amendment
absolutism:
Undoubtedly, a governmental policy of unfettered
communication of ideas does entail dangers. To the
Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived
from free expression were worth the risk. They
embodied this philosophy in the First Amendment’s
command that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . .”135
Likewise, Justice Douglas’s Dennis dissent reads like a summary of
On Liberty:
Free speech has occupied an exalted position because
of the high service it has given our society. Its
protection is essential to the very existence of a
democracy. The airing of ideas releases pressures
which otherwise might become destructive. When ideas
compete in the market for acceptance, full and free
discussion exposes the false and they gain few
adherents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we
hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices and
preconceptions. Full and free discussion keeps a society
from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the
stresses and strains that work to tear all civilizations
apart.136
All of the major arguments from Mill’s chapter “Of the Liberty of
Thought and Discussion” are present in Douglas’s dissent: the freedom
of speech is utile in that it fosters democratic government, the freedom
134
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of speech helps lead to the discovery of truth, and protecting even false
or dangerous speech forces us to recall the reasons for our own beliefs
and prevents us from “falling asleep” at our posts. Unlike Black,
Douglas made repeated references to the Clear and Present Danger
Test in his Dennis dissent,137 and concluded his opinion by specifically
citing to Holmes: “There have been numerous First Amendment cases
before the Court raising the issue of clear and present danger since Mr.
Justice Holmes first formulated the test in Schenck v. United States.”138
Thus, the connection to Mill—through Holmes—was being carried on
by other Justices decades after Holmes’s death.
However much Black and Douglas were, like Holmes and
Brandeis, extending the Millian line of thinking, some of their most
notable opinions were concurrences or dissents on these questions.139
The majority of Justices on the Court did not adhere to Mill’s
philosophy on the freedom of speech during the 1950s and into the
1960s. The Court’s move toward a more libertarian view of the
freedom of speech was evident, however, by the time the Justices
decided Brandenburg v. Ohio. Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan
(“KKK”) leader who invited a TV reporter and camera crew to a KKK
rally; at the rally, Brandenburg made racist remarks and threatened to
take “revengent” action on the President, Congress, and the Supreme
Court if certain demands were not met.140 After being convicted of
violating an Ohio syndicalism statute, he appealed his case to the
Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion, the Court declared that:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
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producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.141
In other words, the Court adopted a standard for incitement cases
where the freedom of speech is protected unless the speaker is stirring
the listener(s) to break the law in the immediate future and such action
is expected. This is remarkably similar to Mill’s statement in On
Liberty that the freedom of speech should be generally protected, but
also that “opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in
which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a
positive instigation to some mischievous act.”142 Mill emphasized that
even mischievous opinions “ought to be unmolested when simply
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when
delivered orally to an excited mob” because of the threat of physical
“harm to others.”143 A united Court declared a Millian and Holmesian
standard for the freedom of speech, one that is controlling for
questions related to incitement in the twenty-first century.144
At first glance, Brandenburg may appear to be a culmination of a
move by the Court toward a more strident Millian position on the
freedom of speech. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Court was
narrowing the definition of obscenity,145 beginning to create
protections for offensive speech,146 giving greater protection to the
press against libel suits,147 and, at one point, even making a very
Millian declaration that “[u]nder the First Amendment, there is no
such thing as a false idea.”148 These points notwithstanding,
Brandenburg and other cases decided during the height of the Warren
Court and early Burger Court did not lead to a fundamental, permanent
shift in the Court’s understanding of the freedom of speech. The
fighting words doctrine remained undisturbed.149 No Court decision
offered any protection to hate speech during the Warren Court era. In
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United States v. O’Brien, the Court restricted protections for symbolic
speech and upheld the prosecution of protestors who burned their draft
cards, and in doing so devised a four-part test for symbolic expression
that was very deferential to government interests.150 Furthermore,
within five years of Brandenburg, the Court expanded the definition of
obscenity in Miller v. California,151 and made it easier to sue for libel
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.152 During the same period, the Court
also allowed for significant regulation of broadcast media in Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.153 The Court
issued a mixed ruling on the Federal Election Campaign Act
(“FECA”) of 1971, striking down federal candidate expenditure limits
as violating the First Amendment but upholding contribution limits to
federal candidates in Buckley v. Valeo.154 Thus, even after
Brandenburg, the Court had not adopted Mill’s views in wholesale
form. Ultimately, the shift initiated by the Court in the 1960s would
instead be brought to fruition during the late 1980s, 1990s, and the
early twenty–first century.
V. A MAJORITY OF THE COURT ADOPTS MILL’S POSITION ON THE
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The Court’s strong move toward a Millian approach to the freedom
of speech, on a consistent basis, began in 1989 with Texas v. Johnson.
After Gregory Johnson burned the U.S. flag as part of a political
protest taking place outside the 1984 Republican National Convention,
he was convicted of violating a Texas statute prohibiting the
“desecration of a venerated object.”155 Writing for a 5-4 majority,
Justice William Brennan overturned Johnson’s conviction on First
Amendment grounds, finding that Texas was unconstitutionally
150
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engaging in viewpoint discrimination: “We never before have held that
the Government may ensure that a symbol be used to express only one
view of that symbol or its referents.”156 He also stated the following,
which is very similar to Mill’s position in On Liberty: “If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”157 Although the
Court did not overrule what it characterized as the “relatively lenient
standard” toward government interests in O’Brien, the Court created
new law and found that since the government interest was related “to
the ‘suppression of free expression,’” the case was “outside of
O’Brien’s test altogether.”158 This greatly limited the use of O’Brien in
symbolic speech cases.159 The Court shifted away from giving the
government more power to restrain symbolic speech and opened the
door for much greater protection of this type of expression.160
Three years later in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the Court eviscerated what
had been its consistent fighting words doctrine since the 1940s. R.A.V.
involved a minor white male who assembled a cross out of chair legs
and, with several other teenagers, burned it in the yard of an AfricanAmerican family living in his neighborhood.161 St. Paul charged
R.A.V. with violating the city’s Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,
which prohibited using certain objects, including a burning cross, in a
way that “one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender . . . .”162 Even though the case involved hate speech,
the Supreme Court unanimously overturned his conviction, with the
majority concluding that the ordinance engaged in both content and
viewpoint discrimination, which is unconstitutional even if the
expression can be categorized as “fighting words.”163 Justice Antonin
156
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Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that “St. Paul has no such
authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”164
Although the symbolic speech in question is clearly something that
would qualify as fighting words, the Court ruled that because St. Paul
disfavored the viewpoint expressed by the burning cross, the ordinance
was unconstitutional.165
Over a decade later in Virginia v. Black, the Court would affirm
that cross-burning cannot be prosecuted unless it constitutes a “true
threat,”166 which includes “statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”167
Thus, the Court unquestionably left in place the protection of any
political messages or hate speech that is carried out by such an act,
only restricting a realistic danger of physical harm to others.168 These
cases moved the Court further toward a Millian position on hate
speech and symbolic speech, as they permit what Mill called the
“absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects,”169 even in
cases where the expression in question involves “intemperate
discussion, [including] invective . . . and the like.”170
The Court’s drive toward Mill’s position on free expression was
further exemplified by its commercial speech decisions in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island and Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States. The 44 Liquormart case involved
a state ban on alcohol advertising, with an exception allowing only for
“price tags or signs displayed” in a liquor store that were “not visible
from the street.”171 The Court struck down the prohibition, advancing a
test developed in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York.172 The strength of Central Hudson’s
164
165
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167
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test for protection of commercial speech, however, had been in doubt
since the Court used the Central Hudson test in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico to uphold a restriction
on advertising for casino gambling from being targeted to residents,
despite the fact that casino gambling was legal and could be advertised
to tourists.173 In announcing the judgment of the 44 Liquormart Court,
Justice John Paul Stevens noted that:
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers
from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will
respond “irrationally” to the truth. The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good.
That teaching applies equally to state attempts to
deprive consumers of accurate information about their
chosen products.174
This reasoning is in line with Mill’s in that it strikes down a law that
prevents people from advertising and learning truthful information
about products that the government has deemed to be immoral.175
Indeed, Mill was clear that one’s “own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant” to restrict expression.176 Along with others,
this case has proved to move the Court permanently away from a more
restrictive approach regarding commercial speech.177 Even though the
Court maintained its four-part Central Hudson test in 44 Liquormart,
three years later in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United
States, the Court confirmed its stronger protection of commercial
speech when it struck down a prohibition on television and radio
advertisements for private casino gambling when “such gambling is
legal.”178 This ruling buried Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates
173
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without specifically overruling it. In Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Ass’n, the Court reaffirmed “the presumption that the
speaker and the audience, not the Government, should be left to assess
the value of accurate and nonmisleading information about lawful
conduct.”179 Like 44 Liquormart, the case promotes the Harm
Principle understanding of free speech, letting people learn
information about gambling and allowing them to make their own
determination regarding whether they want to engage in the activity or
not.
When asked for the first time how to interpret speech on the
Internet in Reno v. ACLU, the Court gave it a strong level of
protection, much greater than what the Court afforded to speech on
other media developed in the twentieth century, such as radio and
television.180 It was also an opportunity for the Court to revisit the
Miller test on obscenity and decide how it would be applied online.181
Reno involved the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), which
prohibited online indecent or obscene communication to minors. The
CDA had failed to sufficiently define what constituted “indecent”
communication,182 and the law’s reference to “obscene” material
encompassed only one portion of the Court’s Miller test.183 Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, declared that the more restrictive
prohibitions for broadcast media announced in Red Lion and Pacifica
would not apply to the Internet, in part, because there was no history
179
180
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of regulation on the Internet like there was for broadcast media.184
Putting aside the potential problem in the Court’s logic (that letting a
law regulating speech on a medium of communication stand in
operation for a longer period of time before being brought to the Court
should result in less constitutional protection afforded to speech on
that medium), the Court clearly moved to a more Millian approach to
protecting expression. Lest there be any doubt in this presumption,
Justice Stevens’s words later in the Court’s opinion demonstrate the
point when explaining why the CDA’s restrictions on Internet
expression were overbroad:
It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the
governmental interest in protecting children from
harmful materials. But that interest does not justify an
unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to
adults. As we have explained, the Government may not
“reduc[e] the adult population . . . to . . . only what is
fit for children.”185
This fits Mill’s ideas from On Liberty quite well: it protects a right of
expression for adults, even when dealing with topics and speech
content many people would find to be immoral. Mill intended the
protection of not only speech but also sexual activities with his Harm
Principle,186 so the application of it in Reno v. ACLU to strike down
the CDA was certainly Millian.
The Court followed Reno v. ACLU with an even more protective
ruling for Internet speech in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.187 This
time, the federal law at issue was the Child Pornography Prevention
Act (“CPPA”).188 The Act “extends the federal prohibition against
child pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict
minors but were produced without using any real children” which
could include images using adults who appear to be children or images
enhanced using computer imaging programs.189 Even though the Court
had upheld child pornography laws that banned non-obscene images
184
185
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187
188
189
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for two decades, dating back to New York v. Ferber—where the Court
emphasized the physiological, emotional, and mental harms to children
involved in the production of such materials190—the Court’s majority
reasoned in Free Speech Coalition that the CPPA was different. The
Ferber Court had noted that the value of permitting child pornography
“is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis,”191 but the Court in Free
Speech Coalition nevertheless held that “where the speech is neither
obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the
protection of the First Amendment” and “some works in this category
might have significant value,”192 resulting in the majority declaring
that the CPPA was overbroad.193 Without the direct physical harm
presented in Ferber, the Court in Free Speech Coalition drew a
distinction that reflects the Harm Principle and struck down the
application of the law at issue. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
concurrence in part pointed out, virtual child pornography serves to
“whet the appetites of child molesters . . . who may use the images to
seduce young children”194 and “defendants indicted for the production,
distribution, or possession of actual child pornography may evade
liability by claiming that the images attributed to them are in fact
computer-generated.”195 However, the majority protected virtual child
pornography for reasons that echoed On Liberty. Reno v. ACLU and
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition combined serve as statements by the
Court that Internet expression between adults—even if it includes
images or statements that are indecent, borderline obscene, or virtual
child pornography—are protected by the First Amendment. The two
cases demonstrate the Court’s Millian position regarding Internet
speech, in that they permit speech that does not cause a direct tangible
harm to someone else;196 they also call into question the Court’s
approach to obscenity that had remained stable since Miller.197
In another context, the Court has gravitated toward what the
majority would see as a Millian position on freedom of expression
190
191
192
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regarding campaign finance, which is amply demonstrated by Citizens
United v. FEC and McCutcheon v. FEC. Each case involved different
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act (“BCRA”) of
2002, which amended FECA.198 The Court had previously taken an
approach toward campaign finance that limited the First Amendment
protection afforded to this type of expression, including by upholding
contribution limits in Buckley199 and by upholding limits on
independent expenditures by corporations in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce.200 As recently as 2003, the Court in
McConnell v. FEC upheld by a 5-4 vote the BCRA’s ban on
electioneering communications by labor unions and corporations thirty
days before a primary and sixty days before a general election.201 In
doing so, the Court majority in McConnell used a standard of review,
‘“closely drawn’ scrutiny,” that it had utilized since Buckley in
campaign finance cases;202 this is also a standard of review that is less
protective of free expression than the more rigorous strict scrutiny
standard.203 The Court continued its use of the closely drawn scrutiny
in McConnell because it reasoned that “[o]ur treatment of contribution
restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First
Amendment freedoms”204 and it “shows proper deference to Congress’
ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which
it enjoys particular expertise.”205
By 2010, however, the Court majority had changed. In Citizens
United, the Court, after Justice Samuel Alito was appointed to the seat
vacated by Justice O’Connor, struck down BCRA’s ban on labor union
and corporation independent expenditures for electioneering
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communications by a 5-4 vote.206 In doing so, the Court overruled
Austin’s upholding of a law that limited corporate independent
expenditures,207 and the Court overruled the portions of McConnell
that upheld restrictions on corporate independent expenditures.208
Overall, the majority in Citizens United reversed its older rulings by
holding that “[l]aws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict
scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the restriction
‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.’”209 Thus, the Court held that all forms of political speech,
even those that are sponsored by corporations at election time, would
be given a high level of protection by the First Amendment. According
to Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, this approach
was required because “the First Amendment stands against attempts to
disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.”210 Put another way, the Court
justified striking down the relevant law for the same reason that Mill
opposed restrictions on expression: government may not deem that
certain positions are the “truth” or that certain types of communication
should be less favored.211
The Court’s more protective approach toward the speech elements
of campaign finance was expressed again four years later in
McCutcheon v. FEC.212 This time, the regulation at issue was the
BCRA’s restrictions on how much individual campaign donors could
directly contribute to federal candidates and noncandidate committees
during every two-year election cycle, which was a total of $123,200 in
2013–14.213 Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for a plurality of the
Court, struck down this aggregate limit, stating that “[t]he right to
participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by
the First Amendment . . . .”214 Chief Justice Roberts stated that even
though this form of expression “may at times seem repugnant to
some,” and that many “would be delighted to see fewer television
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commercials touting a candidate’s accomplishments or disparaging an
opponent’s character,” such unwelcome speech is still protected by the
First Amendment.215 In this vein, Roberts argued that “[t]he
Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a
donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates
it may endorse.”216 Here, Roberts adopted a Millian utilitarian
approach to expression in McCutcheon similar to what the Court
decided in Citizens United: the freedom of speech protects the greater
good, even if the expression being restricted is seen as “repugnant” to
some Americans. The logic here is not that such unrestricted funding
will increase the likelihood of discovering the truth but rather, the
greater good is the protection of the method of expression itself. The
fifth vote to strike down these restrictions belonged to Justice Clarence
Thomas, who would have gone even further by overruling Buckley and
finding all campaign contributions limits unconstitutional.217 Whether
Mill himself would have viewed campaign contributions as “speech”
is immaterial; what is clear in these campaign finance cases is that the
Court applies Mill’s approach to an activity the Court deems to
involve political speech.
United States v. Stevens took the Supreme Court into yet another
area of expression. For the first time, the majority found that
depictions of animal cruelty have constitutional protection.218 Stevens
involved a federal law which prohibited the portrayal of animal cruelty
in any visual or audio depiction “‘in which a living animal is
intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed,’ if that
conduct violates federal or state law where ‘the creation, sale, or
possession takes place.’”219 The law exempted depictions with
“serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value.”220 Writing for an 8-1 majority, Chief
Justice Roberts struck down the provision, stating that, although there
remains a small number of unprotected classes of speech (including
obscenity, defamation, incitement, and child pornography),221
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“Ferber and other cases cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of
the First Amendment.”222 The Court made clear that new emerging
categories of unprotected speech will be exceptionally rare, and the
norm is that classes of speech that are protected now cannot be
restricted in the future.223 For the Chief Justice, the “First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social
costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by
the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the
Government outweigh the costs.”224 The Court concluded that the
statute was “substantially overbroad,” and was therefore invalid under
the First Amendment.225 Overall, it is another case extending the line
of thinking expressed by Mill in On Liberty: the speech expressed
messages which many people find to be abhorrent, but in true
utilitarian fashion, the Chief Justice explained that the benefits of
limiting the power of the state to regulate speech outweigh the costs of
censorship when there is no direct harm to another person.
One year after Stevens, the Court decided Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n. The case challenged a California law that prohibited
the sale or rental to minors of “violent video games” (including games
where players can engage in the “killing, maiming, dismembering, or
sexually assaulting the image of a human being” if done according to
the Miller obscenity standard).226 Justice Scalia, writing for a 7-2
majority, struck down the regulation, finding it to be underinclusive by
not banning all violent content from children (e.g. violent cartoons)
and also overinclusive by banning the sale of videogames to children
whose parents did not object to them playing such games.227 At first
blush this may seem like a restriction on the speech of minors that
would fit one of Mill’s categories that is permissible. However, unlike
the Morse v. Frederick case below, the Brown case was not solely
about restricting the speech of young people with less than fully
222
223

224
225
226
227

Id. at 472.
Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81,
86 (2011).
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
Id. at 482.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011).
Id. at 801–05.

2020

Absolute Freedom of Opinion

39

developed intellectual capacities. The statute was also restricting the
freedom of expression for the makers and sellers of video games, and
it was restricting the choices of parents as to what media they wanted
to allow their children to access.
Indeed, the Brown Court declared in no uncertain terms that “video
games qualify for First Amendment protection,”228 and that although
the “Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on
public matters . . . we have long recognized that it is difficult to
distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.”229 For
the Court, this was clearly a case where protecting public discourse
was at issue (at least potentially), so restrictions on the content of
speech, such as in the relevant California law, are subject to the
highest level of constitutional scrutiny, the strict scrutiny test.230 In the
course of his majority opinion, Justice Scalia noted that minors
themselves are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment
protection, although it is less protection than is afforded to adults.231
And even though the types of messages that were targeted by this law
were excessively violent and misogynistic, the Court concluded that
“disgust is not a valid basis for restricting expression.”232 All told, the
case reminds us that, in Millian fashion, minors do not have full free
speech rights (although they certainly have some), and speech that is
considered vile receives a great deal of protection if it is made by
adults and potentially contains discourse on public matters.
The same year that the Court struck down a prohibition on selling
violent video games to minors, the Court protected offensive speech in
another context in Snyder v. Phelps. After Marine Lance Corporal
Matthew Snyder was killed in Iraq in the line of duty, his father,
Albert Snyder, arranged for his funeral to take place in Snyder’s
hometown of Westminster, Maryland.233 Fred Phelps’s Westboro
Baptist Church, which has a history of picketing at funerals,234
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including military funerals,235 chose to picket near Snyder’s funeral
with homophobic messages expressing a view that that God hates and
punishes the United States for its tolerance of gays and lesbians,
particularly within the military.236 Albert Snyder later filed a lawsuit
claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress because of his
exposure to the signs Westboro Baptist Church displayed at a site near
the funeral.237 At trial, a jury awarded him $2.9 million in
compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages, which was
reduced by the trial court to $2.1 million.238 The Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, overturned the jury awards
by an 8-1 vote.239 According to the Chief Justice, “[t]he Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment . . . can serve as a defense in state tort
suits, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.”240
Although the majority gave special protection to “speech on public
issues”241 above speech on “matters of purely private significance,”242
the Court did not probe the limits of expression rights for the latter
category because the Court determined that the Westboro Baptist
Church’s speech in this case was on matters of public concern, broadly
defined by the Court.243 The Chief Justice concluded that since
“Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public
concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First
Amendment.”244 Furthermore, the Court concluded that even though
the Church’s signs included messages that were homophobic, hateful,
unpatriotic, and perhaps blasphemous, “[s]uch speech cannot be
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”245 The
majority concluded with the following Millian sentiment:
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Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move
them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did
here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a
Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect
even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we
do not stifle public debate.246
Without using the phrase “Harm Principle,” the Court certainly applied
it in this case.
United States v. Alvarez dealt with the constitutionality of the
Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that criminalizes false representations
about having been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by
Congress for the U.S. armed forces.247 Xavier Alvarez was convicted
of violating this law when, as a board member of the Three Valley
Water District Board, he falsely introduced himself at his first public
meeting as having been a retired Marine who was awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor.248 The Court overturned Alvarez’s
conviction, with Justice Kennedy reasoning that “falsity alone may not
suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment.”249 This is an
important point to the case because Alvarez was not making false
statements about anyone else, nor was he trying to use false statements
to financially defraud anyone.250 Given the blanket prohibition the law
had on one’s false statements about being awarded medals, it called
into question theatrical performances or lies whispered within one’s
home.251 For Kennedy, this went too far:
Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful
discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech,
absent any evidence that the speech was used to gain a
material advantage, it would give government a broad
censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s cases or
in our constitutional tradition. The mere potential for
the exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First
246
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Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and
discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.252
This broad protection of speech, even speech we know is false and can
factually verify to be false, still deserves constitutional protection
according to the Court because of the greater danger posed by the
government being able to censor speech. Like Mill, the Court in
Alvarez tells us that allowing false speech actually protects the search
for truth. Indeed, reminiscent of Mill, the Court’s answer is more
speech, not less: “The Government has not shown, and cannot show,
why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest. The facts
of this case indicate that the dynamics of free speech, of
counterspeech, of refutation, can overcome the lie.”253
The Court in McCullen v. Coakley struck down a Massachusetts
law that prohibited knowingly standing on a public way or sidewalk
that was within thirty-five feet of a facility or a hospital where
abortions were performed.254 The law was challenged by Eleanor
McCullen, who represented a group that engaged in what it styled
“sidewalk counseling” outside of abortion clinics to offer information
about abortion alternatives.255 According to Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for a unanimous Court, this wide buffer zone was not narrowly
tailored because it compromised a speaker’s “ability to initiate the
close, personal conversations that they view as essential to ‘sidewalk
counseling.’”256 The buffer zone often forced these speakers to raise
their voices so the patients could hear them, which was “a mode of
communication sharply at odds with the compassionate message” they
desired to express.257 It also made it difficult for speakers to approach
patients to offer them literature.258 The messages of these “sidewalk
counselors” were probably unwelcome to many of the patients and
other persons entering the clinics or hospitals in question. However,
following Millian reasoning, the Court struck down the buffer zone in
a scenario where there was no realistic threat of violence and where
252
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there was opportunity for patients to ignore their messages or provide
their own counterspeech against perceived falsehoods.
Furthermore, Packingham v. North Carolina involved a state law
that prohibited registered sex offenders from using social media
websites that were also accessible to children.259 In an extension of
Reno v. ACLU, the Court found the statute to be overbroad because the
state “with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the
principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for
employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and
otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and
knowledge.”260 According to Justice Kennedy, since social media
websites “can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms
available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard,” the Court
found unconstitutional a complete prohibition on registered sex
offenders accessing them.261 Such an approach echoes Mill: speech by
an adult that is orderly (and perhaps even true) cannot be banned with
no evidence of immediate tangible harm to someone else.
Finally, for two recent cases involving the freedom of speech as it
applies to trademarks, one can examine Matal v. Tam and Iancu v.
Brunetti. At issue in Matal was an application for a trademark by an
Asian-American band called “The Slants.”262 The name, a pejorative
term for Asian-Americans, was chosen by the band as a way to help
“reclaim” the phrase.263 However, the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) refused to process the application, finding it to be in violation
of the Lanham Act, which prohibits trademarks that “disparage” any
persons.264 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Alito struck down
the law, finding that “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it
expresses ideas that offend.”265 The Court even went so far as to say
that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”266 As in R.A.V. and Snyder, the
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Court in Matal found protected expression even when there was, in the
words of Mill, “intemperate discussion,” including “invective.”267
Similarly, in Iancu, the PTO refused to register a trademark for
Erik Brunetti’s clothing line, called FUCT, on the grounds that the
name violated the Lanham Act’s prohibition on “immoral[ ] or
scandalous” trademarks.268 Writing for the Court, Justice Elena Kagan
put forth Millian reasoning on the issue, disapproving the fact that “the
PTO has refused to register marks communicating ‘immoral’ or
‘scandalous’ views about (among other things) drug use, religion, and
terrorism. But all the while, it has approved registration of marks
expressing more accepted views on the same topics.”269 Accordingly,
the Court found the PTO’s refusal to be unconstitutional,270 just as in
Matal, reasoning in Iancu that “[i]f the ‘immoral or scandalous’
bar . . . discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, it must also collide
with our First Amendment doctrine.”271 In Iancu, the Court struck
down the application of a law that prohibited “immoral” expression,272
finding that this reason alone is, in the words of Mill, “not a sufficient
warrant”273 to ban speech. Like in Matal, Mill’s influence in Iancu is
abundantly clear.
VI. THE CURRENT COURT’S FREE SPEECH EXCEPTIONS ARE
(ARGUABLY) MILL’S FREE SPEECH EXCEPTIONS
In recent years, the Justices continue to place some limits on the
freedom of expression, notwithstanding the trend of the modern
Court’s pro-free speech cases explored above. Indeed, the Court has
not simply struck down every government attempt to restrict and even
ban speech in the twenty-first century, as the First Amendment
absolutist Hugo Black might have advised. However, the cases
upholding government restrictions on expression are, at the very least,
more examples of the Court using a Millian philosophy, with both the
majority and dissents disagreeing with each other about how to apply
267
268
269
270
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Millian principles. Even more to the point, in these cases one can also
argue that the majority’s rulings are in line with Mill’s position in On
Liberty, in that they do not extend the protection of the First
Amendment to classes of people whom Mill also would not have given
protection, or they arguably involve incitement. Although we can
debate how well the Court has applied these exceptions by Mill, there
is no question that the Justices are debating within Mill’s framework,
even if they may be misinterpreting his exceptions.
One example of this took place in Garcetti v. Ceballos, where a
Los Angeles County deputy district attorney believed that a search
warrant affidavit contained inaccuracies and informed the defense
attorney in the case as such.274 Ceballos claimed that he was then
subjected to disciplinary action, including “reassignment from his
calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another
courthouse, and denial of a promotion.”275 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
ruled against Ceballos’s claim that his First Amendment rights were
violated. Reasoning that “[w]hen a citizen enters government service,
the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom,”276 the majority concluded that “when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”277 The majority reached this conclusion, in part, for
institutional reasons: “Employers have heightened interests in
controlling speech made by an employee in his or her professional
capacity. Official communications have official consequences,
creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors
must ensure that their employees’ official communications are
accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s
mission.”278
The majority saw the situation in Garcetti the same way that Mill
expressed an exception to protecting the freedom of speech in On
Liberty, in that working as a deputy district attorney involved what
Mill might have referred to as “performance of some definite duty
274
275
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incumbent on him to the public.”279 For the Court majority, Ceballos
voluntarily took on a career as a prosecutor and knew there were
additional limitations on his freedom of expression compared to other
members of society, and he could be punished for his speech in ways
that the general public could not. As we have already seen with the
Roberts Court, the focus is not on whether a particular action leads to
the truth but on whether the conceptual architecture of free speech
protections remains intact.
There is strong evidence, however, based on Mill’s statements in
On Liberty quoted above, that he would have wanted someone like
Ceballos to be able to speak out as a whistleblower, as silencing
Ceballos was potentially, in Mill’s words, “robbing the human race”280
by depriving us of “the opportunity of exchanging error for truth.”281
In his Garcetti dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer also used a Millian
framework but saw this as not falling into a type of performance-ofduty exception: “the Constitution itself here imposes speech
obligations upon the government’s professional employee,” but
“[w]here professional and special constitutional obligations are both
present, the need to protect the employee’s speech is augmented, [and]
the need for broad government authority to control that speech is likely
diminished . . . .”282 In other words, for Breyer, the personal free
speech rights of Ceballos trumped the government’s power to limit
him as a public employee. Regardless of whether the majority or the
dissent was correctly interpreting one of Mill’s exceptions, both the
majority and dissent were debating within a Millian framework.
For another arguable exception to the freedom of speech contained
in On Liberty, one can look to Morse v. Frederick. At a school
sanctioned event, a public high school student unfurled a banner that
read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”283 The student was subsequently
suspended for ten days.284 That suspension was upheld by a 5-4 vote of
the Supreme Court because “‘the constitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings’ . . . and [because] the rights of students ‘must
279
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be “applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.”’”285 In particular, Chief Justice Roberts explained for
the majority that “a principal may, consistent with the First
Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that
speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”286
According to the Chief Justice, schools need greater authority to
restrict speech that promotes illegal drug use because such activity
“can cause severe and permanent damage to the health and well-being
of young people.”287 In other words, like Mill, the Court majority
restricted the speech of young people here because schools are not
dealing with “human beings in the maturity of their faculties.”288
Like in Garcetti, however, one can question whether or not the
majority’s reasoning in Morse really fits Mill’s exception. As noted by
Justice Stevens in dissent, given the relatively facile message being
expressed on the banner, other teenage students possessed sufficient
faculties to be able to evaluate it and ignore it:
Admittedly, some high school students (including those
who use drugs) are dumb. Most students, however, do
not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most
students know dumb advocacy when they see it. The
notion that the message on this banner would actually
persuade either the average student or even the
dumbest one to change his or her behavior is most
implausible.289
Overall, Stevens argues that the high school students in this case
possessed the requisite faculties to be afforded the free speech right to
unfurl a banner expressing this type of idea; in other words, they were
over the hurdle of maturity that Mill describes in On Liberty. Given
the message and the age of the students, Stevens contended that their
rights cannot be completely taken away under these circumstances.
Mill advocated for more limits on freedom for those who have not
attained adulthood,290 but he did not argue anywhere in On Liberty for
285
286
287
288
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290
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completely taking those rights away either, particularly for students
who would be of high school age.291 Nevertheless, for present
purposes it is irrelevant how Mill would have decided Morse; what the
arguments of the majority and dissent show is that the Justices were
debating whether or not the facts of the case fit an exception described
by Mill to the general rule that the freedom of expression is to be
protected.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project is another case where the
Court ruled against the freedom of expression, but it again was
arguably within Mill’s framework. This case interpreted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s prohibition on
providing material support to foreign organizations found to be
engaging in terrorist activity.292 The prohibition is based on the finding
that such organizations “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that
any contribution to such an organization facilitates [their illegal
activities].”293 After the Secretary of State designated the Partiya
Karkeran Kurdistan (“PKK”) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (“LTTE”) as foreign terrorist organizations, the Humanitarian
Law Project and other plaintiffs filed suit against the U.S. Attorney
General, claiming that they should be allowed to train members of
these organizations on how to peacefully resolve their disputes.294
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts proclaimed that even
though the law “regulates speech on the basis of its content,”295 the
statute was constitutional, in part, because the training that the
Humanitarian Law Project proposed to provide to the groups in
question could have also been used “as part of a broader strategy to
291
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promote terrorism.”296 As Chief Justice Roberts elaborated, “training
and advising a designated foreign terrorist organization on how to take
advantage of international entities might benefit that organization in a
way that facilitates its terrorist activities.”297 Thus, the Court was
allowing the government to prohibit political speech on matters of
public concerns (something it has struck down repeatedly in various
other contexts above) because of the identity and location of one end
of those in the conversation between the Humanitarian Law Project
and the PKK or LTTE. Deferring to Congress and the executive
branch on matters of national security and foreign policy,298 the Court
treated these interests as more important than the freedom of speech.
The Court did so, however, because of its concerns about how the
PKK and LTTE might use the information communicated to them. For
this reason, what the Court majority argued was something akin to one
of Mill’s exceptions in On Liberty, in that the Court was essentially
characterizing these groups in the way that Mill classified
“barbarians,”299 and possibly also because they were seen by the
majority as living in “backward states of society.”300
Although the Humanitarian Law Project and similar groups in the
U.S. were not engaging in dangerous speech, the Court majority found
restrictions on their expression constitutional because their speech
could provide material advantages to the PKK and the LTTE, two
groups that were already engaged in activities deemed by the U.S.
government to be terrorist activity.301 The Court majority was not
permitting the government to shut down other speech by the
Humanitarian Law Project, so for the majority it was still within the
same framework as Garcetti and Morse. These points notwithstanding,
the majority in Holder may have been employing a misrepresentation
of Mill and using an approach that was more restrictive than Mill’s.
This may have been a case where, given the ties to terrorism and
foreign affairs, the majority simply found another exception where
Mill would not have. The majority saw this as enabling incitement by
a terrorist organization, but the dissent, penned by Justice Breyer, did
296
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not characterize it as such: “Here the plaintiffs seek to advocate
peaceful, lawful action to secure political ends; and they seek to teach
others how to do the same. No one contends that the plaintiffs’ speech
to these organizations can be prohibited as incitement under
Brandenburg.”302 As with Garcetti and Morse though, the ultimate
outcome of the case is less interesting for our present purposes than is
the fact that both the majority and the dissent were arguing about
whether or not the case fit one of the exceptions to the freedom of
expression articulated by Mill in On Liberty.
For a final example of a case where the Court upholds a restriction
on speech similar to what Mill may have advocated, we can look to
Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar. Williams-Yulee involved a judicial
candidate who was found to have violated a provision of the Florida
Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibited judicial candidates from
personally soliciting campaign funds, requiring any such funds to be
raised indirectly by campaign committees.303 Yulee claimed that the
provision violated her freedom of speech,304 but the Supreme Court,
writing again through Chief Justice Roberts, held by a vote of 5-4 that
the provision served to protect “public confidence in judicial
integrity,” an interest the Court found to be “genuine and
compelling.”305 The Court also found that the state’s rule was
appropriately tailored, in that it restricted only “a narrow slice of
speech,”306 which “leaves judicial candidates free to discuss any issue
with any person at any time.”307 Thus, this was the rare case where the
Court found a restriction on the freedom of speech to be constitutional
under the strict scrutiny test.308 The Court’s ruling in Williams-Yulee,
by focusing on the interest at stake to the public in the expression of
judicial candidates who volunteer to engage in the “performance of
some definite duty incumbent on him [or her] to the public,” 309 can be
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understood to fit one of the exceptions Mill provides to the general
rule of protecting the freedom of speech.
However, as was also true in the last few cases above where the
Court upheld a restriction on expression, the dissent also put forth an
argument that this was not an exception to the Millian framework. For
Justice Kennedy, there was an “irony in the Court’s having concluded
that the very First Amendment protections judges must enforce should
be lessened when a judicial candidate’s own speech is at issue.”310
Instead, Kennedy saw no duty-based limitation that should be placed
on judicial candidates, as they remain people deserving the protections
of free speech for the same reasons we protect free speech for
everyone else:
First Amendment protections are both personal and
structural. Free speech begins with the right of each
person to think and then to express his or her own
ideas. Protecting this personal sphere of intellect and
conscience, in turn, creates structural safeguards for
many of the processes that define a free society. The
individual speech here is political speech. The process
is a fair election. These realms ought to be the last
place, not the first, for the Court to allow
unprecedented content-based restrictions on speech.311
Again, such protections for the freedom of speech—emphasizing
the connection to the freedom of thought, how protecting speech leads
to a greater good, permitting strong protection for speech without a
discernable exception—are statements Mill could have made. The
majority and the dissent remained within Mill’s framework even as
they disagreed about the proper outcome in Williams-Yulee.
VII.

CONCLUSION

John Stuart Mill championed a version of the freedom of
expression in On Liberty that stressed the dangers of government
restrictions on the freedom of speech. Mill used his Harm Principle to
guide when the freedom of speech should be protected. The earlier
history of the Supreme Court is not one that could be characterized as
following On Liberty with respect to the freedom of speech, as the
310
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Justices were routinely upholding restrictions on this right in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; these restrictions deemed
constitutional by the Court included prior restraints.
Mill’s idea of the freedom of expression was eventually adopted by
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis. It was carried on by others,
including Justice Black and Justice Douglas. Over many years, those
Justices inserted Mill’s line of thought into Supreme Court case law,
creating precedential value that could be revisited in a later era. That
era has arrived, with the Court majority over the last three decades
consistently using an approach similar to Mill when interpreting the
Free Speech Clause. Nevertheless, some Justices in the modern era
have adhered to Mill’s position more than others. When examining the
cases above, the Justices who have used Mill’s framework the most in
freedom of expression cases in recent years include Justices Scalia,312
Kennedy,313 Breyer,314 and Roberts.315 These Justices span from liberal
to conservative ideologically,316 and they espouse a variety of methods
of constitutional interpretation.317 But they all have adhered to an
understanding of the freedom of expression that, channeling through
past Justices like Holmes and Douglas, has led them back
intellectually to the thinking of Mill in On Liberty. Indeed, even in
cases where the Court majority rules against the free speech claim, the
debate on the Court is within that Millian framework.
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Regardless of whether the Justices are using Mill’s approach
because they really believe in following Mill, they are blindly
following prior opinions that used Mill, or for some other strategic
reasons, the modern Supreme Court is publicly espousing a Millian
approach to the freedom of speech. Mill’s influence in American
constitutional law may not be as great in other substantive areas, but
his vision of how to protect the freedom of expression has definitely
found a home in the Court. Although the Justices still maintain that
some categories of expression receive less protection—or even no
protection—under the First Amendment,318 the Court has largely
followed a path in recent years that uses a libertarian analysis. The
origins of that approach lie with John Stuart Mill and his advocacy of
the Harm Principle.
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